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Security

It would be nice to have some, wouldn't it ?

DoS attacks on this code are many and varied. If you're not on the global ACL or client ACL, there's relatively little you can do, but if you have an account on the client machine, you can spoof the server if you know the cookie (and it's easy to find, since it's sent in the clear). If do_fork is on, spoofing the server is utterly trivial, and all access control is done at the client...

The moral of this story is `don't put insecure machines in the client ACL'--at least, until version 2.1, which will have md-5 based authentication.

If you are in the global ACL, you can cause DoS attacks by:

And if you aren't, sending a UDP flood should cause CPU usage to go up nicely. The client and server are written in such a way that I believe an actual lock-up (no processes other than them can run) with RT scheduling is impossible, but you can certainly make the client and server machines thrash.

There is also a social engineering attack: be a moron on as many servers as possible via the proxy, and the proxy's IP will be banned.

I hope to do something about some of these in the next release.


next up previous contents
Next: Further Work Up: Using rq2proxy Previous: Quake II latency
Richard Watts
1998-12-22